University of Michigan Law School

University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository
Articles

Faculty Scholarship

2022

A Congressional Review Act for the Major Questions Doctrine
Christopher J. Walker

University of Michigan Law School, cwalke@umich.edu

Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/articles/2689

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/articles
Part of the Administrative Law Commons, Legislation Commons, Public Affairs, Public Policy and
Public Administration Commons, and the Public Law and Legal Theory Commons

Recommended Citation
Walker, Christopher J. "A Congressional Review Act for the Major Questions Doctrine." Harvard Journal of
Law and Public Policy 45, no. 3 (2022): 773.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at University of Michigan Law
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Articles by an authorized administrator of
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

A CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW ACT FOR THE MAJOR
QUESTIONS DOCTRINE
CHRISTOPHER J. WALKER*
Last Term, the Supreme Court recognized a new major questions doctrine, which requires Congress to provide clear statutory authorization for
an agency to regulate on a question of great economic or political significance. This new substantive canon of statutory interpretation will be invoked in court challenges to federal agency actions across the country, and
it will no doubt spark considerable scholarly attention. This Essay does not
wade into those doctrinal or theoretical debates. Instead, it suggests one
way Congress could respond: by enacting a Congressional Review Act for
the major questions doctrine. In other words, Congress could establish a
fast-track legislative process that bypasses the Senate filibuster and similar
slow-down mechanisms whenever a federal court invalidates an agency
rule on major questions doctrine grounds. The successful passage of such
a joint resolution would amend the agency’s governing statute to authorize expressly the regulatory power the agency had claimed in the invalidated rule. In so doing, Congress would more easily have the opportunity
to decide the major policy question itself—tempering the new doctrine’s
asymmetric deregulatory effects and allowing Congress to reassert its primary role in making the major value judgments in federal lawmaking.

* Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. For helpful comments,
thanks are due to Anya Bernstein, Aaron-Andrew Bruhl, Scott MacGuidwin, Eli
Nachmany, and Ganesh Sitaraman, as well as to participants at the University of Michigan law faculty workshop for sparking this idea.
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INTRODUCTION
In a series of Supreme Court decisions this past Term,
culminating in West Virginia v. EPA,1 a majority of the Court
embraced a new version of the major questions doctrine for
interpreting congressional delegations of regulatory authority to
federal agencies.2 Writing for the majority in West Virginia v. EPA,
Chief Justice Roberts perhaps best captures this new substantive
canon of statutory interpretation:
We presume that Congress intends to make major policy
decisions itself, not leave those decisions to agencies. Thus,
in certain extraordinary cases, both separation of powers
principles and a practical understanding of legislative
intent make us reluctant to read into ambiguous statutory
text the delegation claimed to be lurking there. To convince
us otherwise, something more than a merely plausible
textual basis for the agency action is necessary. The agency
instead must point to clear congressional authorization for
the power it claims.3
The impact of this new major questions doctrine on the field of
administrative law will be profound. To borrow a line from the
dissent in another administrative law decision, “[i]t is indeed a
wonderful new world that the Court creates, one full of promise for
administrative-law professors in need of tenure articles and, of
course, for litigators.”4 Application of the doctrine will no doubt be
1. 142 S. Ct. 2587 (2022).
2. Id. at 2615–17 (finding that the Obama Administration EPA’s Clean Power Plan
exceeded the agency’s statutory authority); see also Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. OSHA,
142 S. Ct. 661, 665–66 (2022) (granting a stay of OSHA’s COVID-19 test-or-vaccine mandate for large employers); Ala. Ass’n of Realtors v. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., 141
S. Ct. 2485, 2489–90 (2021) (vacating the stay of an injunction against the CDC’s COVID19 nationwide eviction moratorium).
3. West Virginia, 142 S. Ct. at 2609 (paragraph break deleted; internal quotation marks
and citations omitted).
4. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 1019
(2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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urged in challenges to regulatory actions in federal courts across
the nation. And the lower federal courts will have to flesh out the
doctrine’s contours, especially given that the majority opinion in
West Virginia v. EPA did little to establish an administrable
framework. Indeed, Justice Gorsuch’s separate concurrence may
well be the more important opinion for the new doctrine, as it
provides a roadmap for further development.5
Scholarly questions abound. For example, textualists, especially
those of us who struggle to situate substantive canons and clearstatement rules in the interpretive toolkit, may find it difficult to
square the new major questions doctrine with ordinary statutory
interpretation.6 When it comes to current debates on the
constitutional future of the administrative state, this series of cases
seems to suggest that the Roberts Court—or at least the ideological
middle of the Court, including Chief Justice Roberts—may be
embracing what Professor Jeff Pojanowski has dubbed “neoclassical administrative law.”7 In particular, the Court may be retreating,
at least for now, from recent calls to revive the nondelegation
doctrine as a constitutional constraint on regulation,8 instead opting

5. See West Virginia, 142 S. Ct. at 2616–26 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
6. See, e.g., Chad Squitieri, Who Determines Majorness?, 44 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 463,
480–513 (2021) (critiquing the major questions doctrine on textualist grounds). Jonathan
Adler has suggested one potential textualist path forward. See Jonathan H. Adler, West
Virginia v. EPA: Some Answers about Major Questions, 2022 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 37, 39
(“[T]he burden should be on the agency to demonstrate that the power it wishes to
exercise has been delegated to it. And when confronted with broad, unprecedented,
and unusual assertions of agency power, some degree of judicial skepticism would be
warranted.”). It would be fascinating, moreover, to see how purposivists or even
intentionalists react to this doctrine. See, e.g., Tim Mullins, Administrative Fidelity—
Between Deference and Doubt, YALE J. ON REGUL.: NOTICE & COMMENT (Oct. 18, 2022),
https://www.yalejreg.com/nc/administrative-fidelity/ [https://perma.cc/UCZ9-Q8KQ].
7. Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Neoclassical Administrative Law, 133 HARV. L. REV. 852, 857
(2020).
8. See, e.g., Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2131 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court should “not wait” to reconsider the nondelegation doctrine).
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to cabin administrative action via non-deferential statutory
interpretation.9
Here, however, I do not wade into these doctrinal and theoretical
debates. Instead, my goal is more modest and practical, focusing on
how Congress can respond. I suggest that Congress could enact a
Congressional Review Act (CRA) for the major questions doctrine.
This fast-track legislative process would bypass the Senate
filibuster and similar congressional slow-down mechanisms
whenever a federal court invalidates an agency rule on major
questions doctrine grounds. The successful passage of a CRA-like
joint resolution would amend the agency’s governing statute to
authorize expressly the regulatory power that the agency had
claimed in the judicially invalidated rule. This proposal would
encourage Congress to decide the major policy question itself—
helping to restore Congress’s legislative role in the modern
administrative state—and would counteract the new major
questions doctrine’s asymmetric deregulatory effects.
I. THE MAJOR QUESTIONS DOCTRINE’S
POTENTIAL DEREGULATORY EFFECTS
As Professor Jonathan Adler and I have explored elsewhere, there
is an often-overlooked temporal problem with congressional
delegation, especially when it comes to federal agencies leveraging
old statutes to address new problems.10 Textually broad statutory
delegations to federal agencies can become a source of authority for
agencies to take action at a later time. This later action could be
wholly unanticipated by the enacting Congress and may not
9. See Pojanowski, supra note 7, at 900, 884 (arguing that the “neoclassical approach . . . turns down the constitutional temperature” and “rejects deference to agency
interpretations of substantive law”).
10. Jonathan H. Adler & Christopher J. Walker, Delegation and Time, 105 IOWA L. REV.
1931 (2020); cf. Jody Freeman & David B. Spence, Old Statutes, New Problems, 163 U. PA.
L. REV. 1, 7 (2014) (“We argue that agencies are better suited than courts to do that
updating work and that the case for deferring to agencies in that task is stronger than
ever with Congress largely absent from the policymaking process.”).
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receive support in the current Congress. One way to address this
temporal problem of delegation, we argue, is for Congress to revive
the practice of regular reauthorization of statutes that govern
federal regulatory action. To do so may require Congress to adopt
reauthorization incentives, such as sun-setting provisions, in some
statutory contexts.11
Some version of the major questions doctrine could be another
way to address the temporal problems with congressional
delegation.12 If it is apparent from the statutory text, structure, and
context that the enacting Congress would not have anticipated the
agency’s use of regulatory authority to address a new or different
major policy problem, the reviewing court could invoke the major
questions doctrine to cabin the agency’s regulatory authority. For
the agency to be able to regulate in this area, Congress would have
to enact legislation to declare more expressly that it has delegated
power to the agency to address the major policy question at issue.
The doctrine thus forces Congress to make the value judgment
when it comes to federal agencies attempting to use old statutes to
address new or otherwise unanticipated issues of great economic
or political significance.
In The New Major Questions Doctrine, Professors Dan Deacon and
Leah Litman underscore an important criticism of this vision for
administrative governance.13 The new major questions doctrine
seems to operate in only one direction: deregulatory. The reviewing
court asks Congress for a clearer statement of delegation on the
major question. Yet the “vetogates” in Congress,14 especially in our
11. See Adler & Walker, supra note 10, at 1974–82.
12. For the purposes of this Essay, I bracket for another day my concerns with the
new major questions doctrine as a matter of interpretive theory and legal doctrine.
13. Daniel T. Deacon & Leah M. Litman, The New Major Questions Doctrine, 109 VA.
L. REV. (forthcoming 2023), https://ssrn.com/abstract=4165724. For a defense of the doctrine, see Louis Capozzi, The Past and Future of the Major Questions Doctrine, 84 OHIO ST.
L.J. (forthcoming 2023), https://ssrn.com/abstract=4234683.
14. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Vetogates and American Public Law, 31 J. L. ECON.
& ORG. 756 (2015).
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current era of political polarization, make it near impossible to
respond. These deregulatory effects are exacerbated by a clearstatement rule imposed retroactively on statutes enacted prior to
the announcement of the new doctrine. That enacting Congress
may not have anticipated the need to provide more than broad
statutory text to authorize the agency to regulate on a major policy
question based on new facts or changed circumstances.
For some supporters of a reinvigorated nondelegation doctrine,
this is a feature—not a bug—of the new major questions doctrine.
In their view, regulation should be the exception for federal
lawmaking, not the rule. For others concerned with congressional
over-delegation, however, our normative end is not necessarily
deregulation, but rather entrusting Congress—not federal agencies
(or courts)—to make the major value and policy judgments when it
comes to lawmaking at the federal level. The new major questions
doctrine may constrain federal agencies in this area, but it does too
little to encourage Congress to play its role in making major policy
judgments. And it risks entrenching a potential judicial error
concerning congressional intent about an otherwise textually
plausible agency statutory interpretation.
II. A POTENTIAL CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE
For those of us interested in reinvigorating Congress’s role in the
modern administrative state, there are ways for Congress to fasttrack legislative responses to pressing problems. Congress has enacted statutes that bypass the Senate filibuster for various reasons.
Budget reconciliation, created by the Congressional Budget Act of
1974,15 is one prominent example that Congress has used aggressively in recent years.16 Congress has also enacted various statutes
15. Pub. L. No. 93-344, 88 Stat. 297 (codified at 2 U.S.C. §§ 601–88).
16. See, e.g., Inflation Reduction Act of 2022, Pub. L. No. 117-169 (using budget reconciliation to pass landmark climate change legislation); American Rescue Plan Act of
2021, Pub. L. No. 117-2 (using budget reconciliation to pass a $1.9 trillion economic
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to fast-track authority for the president to negotiate international
trade agreements.17 And under the National Emergencies Act and
the War Powers Act, Congress has bypassed the Senate filibuster to
terminate presidential declarations of emergency18 and to authorize
or terminate the use of force overseas,19 respectively.
A. The Congressional Review Act
If Congress were interested in responding to the new major questions doctrine, perhaps the most analogous legislative tool is the
Congressional Review Act of 1996 (CRA).20 Motivated by concerns
that federal agencies may adopt regulations opposed by current
legislative majorities, the CRA creates an expedited process for considering joint resolutions to overturn agency regulations.21 In effect,
the CRA creates a means through which Congress can police an
agency’s exercise of its delegated authority.22
stimulus package to address the COVID-19 pandemic); Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017,
Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054 (using budget reconciliation to pass expansive tax
cuts).
17. See, e.g., Michael A. Carrier, All Aboard the Congressional Fast Track: From Trade to
Beyond, 29 GEO. WASH. J. INT’L L. & ECON. 687, 696 (1996).
18. 50 U.S.C. § 1622(b) (“Not later than six months after a national emergency is declared . . . each House of Congress shall meet to consider a vote on a joint resolution to
determine whether that emergency shall be terminated.”).
19. 50 U.S.C. § 1545(b) (“Any joint resolution or bill [authorizing forces pursuant to
the War Powers Act] shall become the pending business of the House in question (in
the case of the Senate the time for debate shall be equally divided between the proponents and the opponents), and shall be voted on within three calendar days thereafter,
unless such House shall otherwise determine by yeas and nays.”); id. § 1546 (substantially similar language for terminating overseas forces).
20. Congressional Review Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-121, 110 Stat. 868 (codified at
5 U.S.C. §§ 801–808 (2012)). See generally MAEVE P. CAREY & CHRISTOPHER M. DAVIS,
CONG. RSCH. SERV., R43992, THE CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW ACT: FREQUENTLY ASKED
QUESTIONS (last updated Nov. 12, 2021), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43992.pdf.
21. 5 U.S.C. § 801(a)(3)(B).
22. See, e.g., Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Reawakening the Congressional Review Act, 41 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. POL’Y 187, 192–93 (2018) (providing extensive overview of the CRA and arguing
that “the CRA should be helpful in corralling agency excesses, but new legislation
could achieve that result more effectively and efficiently”); cf. Squitieri, supra note 6, at
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Congress can only use the CRA within a relatively short window
of time after the promulgation of a major rule.23 Under the CRA,
before any new rule may take effect, the agency must submit a report on the rule to Congress (and the Comptroller General).24 If the
regulation is deemed a “major rule”—defined as any rule the White
House’s Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs concludes
will likely have “an annual effect on the economy of $100 [million]
or more,” or otherwise have a significant effect on consumer prices
or the economy25—it shall not take effect for at least 60 days after its
submission to Congress.26 This waiting period provides Congress
with an opportunity to review major rules and consider whether to
overturn them before the major rules go into effect.
The CRA creates a streamlined process for Congress to overturn
a major rule by enacting a “joint resolution of disapproval.”27 If the
relevant Senate committee does not act on the disapproval resolution within 20 calendar days from the applicable date, “such committee may be discharged from further consideration of such joint
resolution upon a petition supported in writing by 30 Members of
the Senate, and such joint resolution shall be placed on the calendar.”28 The purpose of this mechanism is to streamline the review
process by preventing a committee from acting as a bottleneck. Under the CRA, moreover, Senators waive all points of order,29 cannot

491 (arguing that the major questions doctrine is in tension with the CRA because
“where the major questions doctrine presumes that Congress wishes to answer major
questions itself, the CRA exhibits a congressional presumption that agencies will answer major questions through major rules”).
23. 5 U.S.C. § 802(a) (providing that the window for the introduction of a joint resolution of disapproval begins when Congress receives the agency’s report on the rule
“and end[s] 60 days thereafter (excluding days either House of Congress is adjourned
for more than 3 days during a session of Congress)”).
24. Id. § 801(a)(1)(A).
25. Id. § 804(2).
26. Id. § 801(a)(3)(A).
27. Id. § 801(a)(3)(B).
28. Id. § 802(c).
29. Id. § 802(d)(1).
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propose amendments or delay motions,30 and are limited to 10
hours for debate.31 As a result, only a simple majority of Senators
must support a CRA resolution for passage.
If Congress passes the CRA disapproval resolution (and the President signs it into law), the substantive effect of the resolution does
not just repeal the agency rule at issue. It also prohibits the agency
from promulgating “a new rule that is substantially the same” as
the rule at issue “unless the reissued or new rule is specifically authorized by a law enacted after the date of the joint resolution disapproving the original rule.”32
B. A CRA Approach to the Major Questions Doctrine
Congress could employ a CRA-like approach when federal courts
invalidate regulations under the major questions doctrine. Once the
regulation is judicially invalidated, Congress could have a window
of time during which it could introduce a joint resolution. When it
comes to the legislative process, Congress could require the same
or similar CRA fast-track procedures. These include a committee
discharge mechanism, a limitation on amendments and delay motions, and a simple majority up-down vote in the Senate after a set
period of time for debate. If the resolution makes it through the
House, the Senate, and the President, the substantive effect would
be to amend the relevant statute in two limited ways. First, this
amended statute would provide clear authorization for the regulatory power the agency had claimed in the invalidated rule. Second,
it would authorize additional regulatory power that is “substantially the same” as the authority the reviewing court had precluded
on major questions doctrine grounds.
In so doing, the current Congress would provide the “clear statement” required by the major questions doctrine, along with some
regulatory flexibility for the agency to modify its approach as
30. Id.
31. Id. § 802(d)(2).
32. Id. § 801(b)(2).
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needed based on changed circumstances. Importantly, the resolution would not codify the agency’s prior rule. Nor would it amend
the agency’s governing statute in any other way. If the rule had
been judicially vacated in a universal manner, the agency could reissue the rule “as is” without, where applicable, the need to restart
the notice-and-comment process.33 On further judicial review, such
rule would be subject to statutory and, of course, constitutional constraints. For instance, an agency’s reissued rule can be substantively
permissible under the agency’s governing statute (as amended by
the joint resolution), but still be set aside on reasoned-decisionmaking grounds as arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative
Procedure Act.34 But the agency also would retain the discretion inherent in the statutory framework, including the option not to reissue the previously invalidated rule at all or to pursue a different
regulatory approach through the applicable administrative process.
Admittedly, triggering a CRA-like process through judicial action
raises issues not present in the original CRA context. Under the
CRA, the clock for congressional action starts when the agency
sends the proposed rule to Congress. Judicial review complicates
things. A lower federal court invalidating an agency rule on major
33. If the rule had been set aside only as to the parties before the court, the joint resolution would eliminate any major questions doctrine challenges to that part of the existing rule, including in any pending or future litigation. For the purposes of this Essay,
I do not wade into the debate on what it means under the APA for a court to “set aside
agency action,” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2), and, in particular, whether such relief can vacate an
agency rule universally or just as to the parties before the court. Compare Samuel L.
Bray, Multiple Chancellors: Reforming the National Injunction, 131 HARV. L. REV. 417, 439
n.121 (2017) (arguing that “whatever one’s view of how much the APA codified or
changed existing practice, it never speaks with the clarity required to displace the
longstanding practice of plaintiff-protective injunctions”), with Mila Sohoni, The Power
to Vacate a Rule, 88 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1121, 1129 (2020) (arguing that “the APA should
be understood to authorize universal vacatur”).
34. See Dep’t of Commerce v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2576 (2019) (“We do not hold
that the agency decision here was substantively invalid. But agencies must pursue their
goals reasonably. Reasoned decisionmaking under the Administrative Procedure Act
calls for an explanation for agency action. What was provided here was more of a distraction.”).
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questions grounds is not the end of the judicial process. There is
always a possibility that an appellate court or the Supreme Court
reverses the lower court decision, and even more so in the context
of a lower court invalidating an agency rule on major questions
doctrine grounds. Allowing the first judicial decision to trigger the
CRA-like process would no doubt incentivize litigants to engage in
strategic forum-shopping in the lower courts.
On the other hand, waiting for the mandate to issue, or for the
Supreme Court to weigh in, would arguably prolong the process
too long, especially for major rules that may be signature regulatory
policies of a new presidential administration. After all, just like in
the original CRA context, successful passage of a joint resolution
would require support from a simple majority of both houses of
Congress and from the President. Such support is most likely to
happen when there is unified government, perhaps shortly after a
presidential election when the President’s party is more likely to
also control Congress.35 Not allowing for legislative fast-track review of an agency rule invalidated on major questions doctrine
grounds until later in the litigation process increases the likelihood
that the Congress (and the President) in office when the rule issued
are no longer in power. Such delay thus could frustrate the political
branches’ ability to implement an electoral mandate. As such, that
approach, too, would lead to forum-shopping incentives.
Recognizing these concerns, I tentatively suggest that the trigger
should be the first federal court decision to invoke the major questions doctrine. In many circumstances, waiting for the Supreme
Court to consider the case would be ideal, but the delay and strategic litigation incentives such approach introduces are just too great.
The hope is that the prospect of further judicial review may be a
potent political consideration that counsels Congress to stay its

35. See Adler & Walker, supra note 10, at 1952 (“Because the CRA resolutions are
subject to presidential veto, Congress’ only real opportunity to use the CRA is to rescind ‘midnight regulations’ adopted at the end of a presidential administration.”).
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hand until the Supreme Court weighs in. That said, one could imagine a narrower statutory scheme, in which the CRA-like process
is triggered only by a Supreme Court decision that invalidates a
regulation on major questions doctrine grounds. In all events, the
CRA window would then close shortly (perhaps 30 or 60 legislative
days) after the formal judicial mandate issues.36
III.

INTER-BRANCH DYNAMICS

This short Essay does not try to respond to all potential concerns
and complications about how to implement a CRA for the major
questions doctrine. The goal here is to introduce the idea and
hopefully spur congressional and scholarly attention. This Part,
however, anticipates some of the concerns about how the dynamics
of the proposal would play out in each branch of the federal
government.
A. Article III Evasion
One concern is that federal courts might style their opinions to
evade this fast-track legislative process. This strategic behavior
could manifest in three ways. First, federal courts could fail to
invoke the major questions doctrine by name in order to avoid
triggering the CRA process. Second, federal courts could
strategically find the statute unambiguous or “clear enough”37
(even when there are multiple plausible interpretations), thus
foreclosing the agency rule. Third, federal courts could strike down
the statutory delegation as unconstitutional on nondelegation
doctrine grounds.

36. See Fed. R. App. Pro. 41 (detailing rules for issuing the mandate).
37. See Christopher J. Walker, Gorsuch’s “Clear Enough” & Kennedy’s Anti-“Reflexive
Deference”: Two Potential Limits on Chevron Deference, YALE J. ON REGUL.: NOTICE &
COMMENT (June 22, 2018) (discussing Wis. Cent. Ltd. v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2067,
2074 (2018)), https://www.yalejreg.com/nc/gorsuchs-clear-enough-kennedys-anti-reflexive-deference-two-potential-limits-on-chevron-deference/ [https://perma.cc/6FU6NL5X].
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To address the first concern, it would be important to frame the
CRA-like statute to sweep more broadly than an express citation
to—or invocation of—the major questions doctrine. This CRA-like
statute should include any judicial decision that rejects—as a matter
of statutory interpretation—a textually plausible agency statutory
interpretation based on the “major-ness” of the policy question at
issue. It would encompass decisions framed as resting on a
threshold clear-statement rule,38 a Chevron step-one application of a
substantive canon to resolve the statutory ambiguity,39 or a Chevron
step-two reasonableness check on the agency’s interpretation.40
Interpreting the grounds of the judicial decision would be left to
the congressional process, with the Parliamentarians playing a
critical role. As Professors Jesse Cross and Abbe Gluck have
detailed,
“The
Parliamentarians
make
procedural
recommendations on consequential matters,” such as committee
referrals for introduced bills, “germaneness” determinations for
proper bill amendments in the House, and “Byrd rule”
determinations in the Senate for legislative provisions that qualify
for the filibuster-free budget reconciliation process.41 Here, the
Parliamentarian for each chamber would make a recommendation
on whether the proposed resolution addresses an agency rule that
has been invalidated by a court on major questions doctrine
grounds. To be sure, under each chamber’s rules, the presiding
officer, subject to override by a chamber majority, would make the
final ruling as to whether the joint resolution qualifies for this fasttrack process. But as Professors Cross and Gluck explain, “these
38. See, e.g., West Virginia v. EPA, 142 S. Ct. 2587, 2609 (2022).
39. See, e.g., FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159–60 (2000).
40. See, e.g., Util. Air Regul. Grp. v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 324 (2014). See generally Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984) (commanding
courts to defer to an agency’s interpretation of a statute it administers (“step zero”) if
the statutory provision at issue is ambiguous (“step one”) and the agency’s interpretation is reasonable (“step two”)).
41. Jesse M. Cross & Abbe R. Gluck, The Congressional Bureaucracy, 168 U. PA. L. REV.
1541, 1585–86 (2020).

786

Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy

Vol. 45

[Parliamentarian] recommendations are almost always followed by
the presiding officer—and the presiding officer’s ruling, in turn, is
almost never appealed or overturned by a chamber majority,
especially in the House.”42 Basing this decision on internal
processes would shield the decision from judicial review; indeed,
to avoid confusion, the CRA-like statute should preclude judicial
review on this determination.43
As for the latter two concerns, this CRA-like legislative response
would provide no remedy. Instead, it would leave judicial
decisions of statutory clarity and unconstitutionality (such as an
overly broad statutory delegation) to the ordinary legislative
process and the court of public opinion. As Professor Adler and I
explore elsewhere, Congress has other tools, such as the regular
reauthorization process, to revisit outdated statutes that govern
federal agencies, to update them to address new problems and
changed circumstances, and to provide additional statutory
instructions to channel regulatory activity.44
On the flipside, this legislative innovation would encourage
courts to engage more seriously in ordinary statutory interpretation
and to invoke the major questions doctrine more carefully and
selectively. It would likely have a similar restraining force on
vexatious litigation behavior. These constraints on potential abuse
of the major questions doctrine would be welcome byproducts of
the legislative reform.
B. Article II Overreach
Another concern is that this proposal may encourage the
President and federal agencies to overclaim regulatory authority to
take advantage of a filibuster-free legislative process. While federal
agencies are no doubt influenced by judicial review and potential

42. Id. at 1586.
43. Cf. 5 U.S.C. § 805 (providing in the CRA that “[n]o determination, finding, action,
or omission under this chapter shall be subject to judicial review”).
44. See Adler & Walker, supra note 10, at 1972–84.
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congressional action, priorities and politics should constrain
flagrant executive abuse and overreach.
Consider, for instance, a related proposal. Last year, Professors
Jody Freeman and Matthew Stephenson proposed a creative use of
the CRA: Federal agencies should promulgate major rules that are
the opposite of what the agencies and the President actually want
and then get Congress to disapprove of those rules under the
CRA.45 Professors Freeman and Stephenson argue that this CRA
disapproval resolution would effectively amend the agency’s
governing statute to authorize the opposite of the proposed rule.
For reasons similar to those offered separately by Professors
Jonathan Adler and Adam White,46 I am skeptical that this is a
proper interpretation of the CRA. More importantly for the
purposes of this Essay, the Biden Administration has shown no
interest in leveraging the CRA in this “good-faith faithless
execution”47 manner. That is perhaps because of the political costs
of such tactics and also, no doubt, because of limited resources and
higher policy priorities—both in the White House and on Capitol
Hill.
I would expect similar political dynamics to limit executive
overreach with the proposal set forth in this Essay. That is not to
say that a CRA-like approach for the major questions doctrine will
have no impact on bureaucratic behavior. The President and federal
agencies may well be more aggressive on the margins in their
regulatory efforts, especially when judicial review will likely take
45. Jody Freeman & Matthew C. Stephenson, The Untapped Potential of the Congressional Review Act, 59 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 279, 281–82 (2022).
46. Jonathan H. Adler, Could Congress Use the Congressional Review Act to Expand
Agency Authority?, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Aug. 19, 2021, 5:09 PM), https://reason.com/volokh/2021/08/19/could-congress-use-the-congressional-review-act-to-expand-agency-authority/ [https://perma.cc/WU24-6Q5V]; Adam White, The Temptation
of “Good-Faith Faithless Execution”, YALE J. ON REGUL.: NOTICE & COMMENT (Aug. 15,
2021), https://www.yalejreg.com/nc/the-temptation-of-good-faith-faithless-execution/
[https://perma.cc/SW9C-7ZWT].
47. White, supra note 46 (capitalization adapted from title).
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place while the President is still in power and the President’s party
controls Congress. This pro-regulatory shift in behavior may just
mitigate the constraining influence the Court’s new major
questions doctrine no doubt already has had on administrative
action.48 But the political costs, resource constraints, and
uncertainties inherent in the legislative process should confine
brazen executive overreach. In all events, the ultimate check is that
a majority of both chambers in Congress would have to agree.
C. Article I Political Feasibility
The most obvious concern is whether Congress would enact this
CRA-like process in the first place. There are substantive reasons
why some members of Congress would not, putting aside the
political challenges of polarization and congressional gridlock.
After all, the new major questions doctrine purports to require
Congress to make the major policy judgments in federal lawmaking
through the ordinary legislative process. As Justice Gorsuch
justifies the doctrine in his concurrence in West Virginia v. EPA,
“lawmaking under our Constitution can be difficult. But that is
nothing particular to our time nor any accident.”49 He further
explains:
The difficulty of the design sought to serve other ends too.
By effectively requiring a broad consensus to pass
legislation, the Constitution sought to ensure that any new
laws would enjoy wide social acceptance, profit from input
by an array of different perspectives during their
consideration, and thanks to all this prove stable over time.
The need for compromise inherent in this design also
sought to protect minorities by ensuring that their votes
48. Cf. Christopher J. Walker, Chevron Inside the Regulatory State: An Empirical Assessment, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 703, 722–24 (2014) (exploring survey responses from agency
rule drafters about how their agencies may be more aggressive in rulemaking when
they believe Chevron deference—as opposed to Skidmore deference or no deference—
would apply on judicial review).
49. West Virginia v. EPA, 142 S. Ct. 2587, 2618 (2022) (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
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would often decide the fate of proposed legislation—
allowing them to wield real power alongside the majority.
The difficulty of legislating at the federal level aimed as well
to preserve room for lawmaking by governments more local
and more accountable than a distant federal authority, and
in this way allow States to serve as laboratories for novel
social and economic experiments.50
Admittedly, this CRA-like fast-track proposal would undercut—
to some degree—compromise and consensus building by removing
many of the procedures in the Senate that can help advance those
goals. Accordingly, it may be difficult to see Republicans (and other
members of Congress with an institutionalist or limitedgovernment mindset) providing an avenue for Congress to bypass
the filibuster when it comes to rules that address major policy
questions. That said, these Senate procedures are not
constitutionally required. To the contrary, Congress has already
embraced fast-track legislative processes in other contexts, such as
for budget reconciliation, the CRA, national emergencies, treaties,
and war powers. Here, the fast-track process would not extend to
any major policy debate or any judicial decision constraining agency
action—only to those circumstances in which a federal court has
found that the agency statutory interpretation is textually plausible
yet Congress has not clearly enough authorized the agency to
regulate on the major question.
In that sense, this proposal is much narrower than the Supreme
Court Review Act51—a bill a group of Senate Democrats introduced
earlier this summer, which is based on a narrower proposal
Professor Ganesh Sitaraman suggested in the pages of The
Atlantic.52 That legislation, if enacted, would create a fast-track
50. Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
51. S. 4681, 117th Cong. (2022).
52. Ganesh Sitaraman, How to Rein In an All-Too-Powerful Supreme Court, THE ATLANTIC (Nov. 16. 2019) (“Congress could pass a Congressional Review Act for the Supreme
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legislative process for Congress to pass substantive legislation to
respond to any Supreme Court decision that interprets a federal
statute in any way or “interprets or reinterprets the Constitution of
the United States in a manner that diminishes an individual right
or privilege that is or was previously protected by the Constitution
of the United States.”53 Although the proposed legislation purports
to prohibit “extraneous matters” from being included in a fasttrack-eligible bill responding to a Supreme Court decision, the
legislation provides that the responsive bill can amend a statutory
provision that is “directly implicated” by a Supreme Court
decision, or in the constitutional context, allow responsive
legislation that is “reasonably relevant” to a Supreme Court
decision.54
As Professor Aaron-Andrew Bruhl observes in his analysis of the
legislation, these provisions are “loose” and “unclear around the
edges.”55 That assessment is charitable. Once there is a filibusterfree legislative process for Congress to legislate on anything related
to a Supreme Court statutory or constitutional precedent, the
incentives for abuse and misuse would be hard to resist. And, as
Professor Bruhl notes, outside of the Senate Parliamentarian’s
recommended rulings that historically receive great deference but
can be rejected by the presiding officer and overruled by a Senate
majority, there is no judicial review or other non-political check on
this process; “[t]he punishment for misapplication or manipulation
of the procedures comes from other members or the voters.”56
By contrast, a CRA-like approach limited to just judicial decisions
invoking the major questions doctrine to invalidate an agency rule
Court, which would enable it to overturn Court decisions on legislative matters with
greater speed and ease.”), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/11/congressional-review-act-court/601924/ [https://perma.cc/K6L5-HHPA].
53. S. 4681, § 2.
54. Id.
55. Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, The Supreme Court Review Act: Fast-Tracking the Interbranch Dialogue at *8 (Sept. 27, 2022, draft), https://ssrn.com/abstract=4227162.
56. Id. at *9.
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would be much less susceptible to congressional abuse or misuse.
Like the CRA itself, a joint resolution would not allow for any other
substantive amendments; its passage would just amend the
agency’s governing statute to provide the clear authorization for
the judicially invalidated rule, as well as the authorization for any
subsequent agency rules that are substantially the same as the
invalidated rule. There would be no fast-track opportunity for any
other amendments or substantive legislative changes to the
agency’s governing statute. That would require the ordinary
legislative process.
The purposes of these two legislative proposals, moreover, differ
substantially. The Supreme Court Review Act, as its co-sponsor
Senator Sheldon Whitehouse puts it, is about “check[ing] the
activist Court’s rogue decisions . . . .”57 Or, as co-sponsor Senator
Catherine Cortez Masto explains, the bill—if enacted—would
create a filibuster-free process for Congress to respond “when the
Court misinterprets Congressional intent or strips Americans of
fundamental rights.”58 In other words, this legislation is about
Congress reviewing and overriding a Supreme Court
interpretation of a statute (or the Constitution), pitting the branches
against each other.
A CRA-like approach limited to the major questions doctrine, by
contrast, should not be viewed as a congressional override of a
judicial interpretation of a statute. The new major questions
doctrine operates in a unique way. The Court in West Virginia v.
EPA found that the statute provides “a plausible textual basis for
the agency action”; it only invalidated the agency rule because it
found no “clear congressional authorization” for the agency to

57. U.S. Senator Sheldon Whitehouse, Press Release, Whitehouse, Cortez Masto Propose Congressional Check on Supreme Court Decisions (July 28, 2022),
https://www.whitehouse.senate.gov/news/release/whitehouse-cortez-masto-proposecongressional-check-on-supreme-court-decisions [https://perma.cc/EVR5-PNZU].
58. Id.
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regulate on the major question.59 In other words, a CRA-like
approach to the major questions doctrine is about Congress
accepting the reviewing court’s invitation to decide the major
policy question more definitively in a way that the court had
already decided was at least a textually plausible interpretation of
the existing statute. For this type of up-down vote on whether an
agency has regulatory authority to address a major policy question,
the consensus and compromise values the Senate filibuster and
related procedures can promote seem to be far less valuable than in
the context of the Supreme Court Review Act (or than in the context
of ordinary substantive legislation).
Thus, unlike the Supreme Court Review Act, there are reasons to
believe that some Republicans in Congress may be willing to
consider voting for this CRA-like proposal to get it over the sixtyvote threshold in the Senate. It was not too long ago that Senator
Mike Lee and other Senate Republicans founded the Article I Project to restore Congress’s role as the “first branch” of government.60
As Senator Lee explained back in 2017, “Our goal is to develop and
advance and hopefully enact an agenda of structural reforms that
will strengthen Congress by reclaiming the legislative powers that
have been ceded to the executive branch.”61
To be sure, the new major questions doctrine also combats the
ceding of legislative power to the executive branch, but it does so
at the risk of judicial error in limiting what Congress had
authorized the agency to do. A CRA-like process would be a
structural reform to strengthen Congress’s ability to make that final
decision when it comes to major policy questions. By codifying a
CRA for the major questions doctrine, Congress would also be
59. 142 S. Ct. 2587, 2609 (2022) (emphasis added).
60. Michelle Cottle, Mike Lee’s New Crusade, THE ATLANTIC (Feb. 12, 2016),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/02/mike-lee-article-one-project/462564/ [https://perma.cc/8GY5-2BZ2].
61. Rachel del Guidice, 3 Bills Sen. Mike Lee Thinks Could Shift Power ‘Back to the People’,
DAILY SIGNAL (May 17, 2017), https://www.dailysignal.com/2017/05/17/3-bills-senmike-lee-thinks-shift-power-back-people/ [https://perma.cc/SG6J-5GJV].
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codifying—either implicitly or explicitly—the existence of the
major questions doctrine in the first place. Such legislative
recognition of this judicial doctrine may have political and policy
value for Republicans in Congress.
CONCLUSION
The new major questions doctrine has arrived, and it is here to
stay. Its breadth and impact will likely depend on how it is further
developed by litigants and judges in the lower courts. But
Congress, if it chooses, can respond. As this Essay details, Congress
could enact a Congressional Review Act to respond to the major
questions doctrine, allowing for a fast-track, streamlined process
for Congress to amend the agency’s governing statute to provide
clear authorization for an invalidated rule. This legislative
innovation would not only mitigate the deregulatory effects of the
new major questions doctrine, but it would also allow Congress to
reassert its legislative role in making the major value judgments in
federal lawmaking.
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